Following the recent generalization of social choice in the literature on judgment aggregation, we extend the analysis of freedom of choice from sets of alternatives to sets of opinions. We establish the analogue of the cardinality based freedom of choice measure and suggest an alternative...

In this paper we compare a minisum and a minimax procedure as suggested by Brams et al. for selecting committees from a set of candidates. Using a general geometric framework as developed by Don Saari for preference aggregation, we show that antipodality of a unique maximin and a unique minisum...

Extending on an impossibility result by Baigent [1], it is shown that an anonymous social choice procedure which preserves preference proximity cannot satisfy the weakest possible form of non-imposition.

This paper gives a formulation for the condition of preservation of preference proximity which, unlike previous formulations, respects the spirit of anonymity pervading social choice theory. Proximity preservation is however shown to be inconsistent with a very weak condition guaranteeing a...