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The paper provides a psychological explanation of uncertainty aversion based on the fear of regret. We capture an agent’s regret using a reference-dependent utility function in which the agent’s utility depends on the performance of his chosen option relative to the performance of the option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993554
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275182
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277257
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277272
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007400235
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This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an ex post outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without ex post outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359487
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757722
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer’s roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006168854