Constructing a two-good (competitive and imperfectly-competitive goods), two-primary factor (capital and labor) and two-country model of international trade where the imperfectly-competitive sector is subject to increasing returns to scale, we establish an oligopolistic version of the...

Constructing a two-good (a competitive and monopolized goods), two-primary factor (capital and labor) and two-country model of international trade where the monopolized sector is subject to increasing returns to scale, we establish an oligopolistic version of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem.

This article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply...

We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open-loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting...

We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open-loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting...