Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining and monopsony), this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price-cost margins and scale economies. Using an unbalanced panel of...

Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue. This...

In this paper, we investigate whether international trade has affected workers?wages and their bargaining power in particular in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995 by relying on a rent-sharing framework. Using a sample of more than 12 000 firms, we find that...

This thesis consists of five self-contained papers on factor demand and market power. <p> The main objective of Paper [I] is to analyze potential effects on the Swedish forest sector of a continuing rise in the use of forest resources as a fuel in energy generation. The background to the problem...</p>

Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining and monopsony), this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price-cost margins and scale economies. Using an unbalanced panel of...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Applied Econometrics</I>, 2013, 28(1), 1-46. 10.1002/jae.1256 Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets...</i>

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games...

One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric...

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the...

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market-clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated....