Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment,...

Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors...

Entrepreneurs often face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks from their business investments. Motivated by this observation, we extend the standard real options approach to investment to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of business investments, consumption-saving...

We develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial firms, and demonstrate the implications of non-diversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. We characterize the optimal capital...

The real options framework has been used extensively to analyze the timing of investment under uncertainty. While standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference, there is substantial evidence that agents are very impatient about choices in the...

This paper provides a model of optimal investment timing in a decentralized firm under conditions of agency and asymmetric information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The...

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and...

We propose a model of dynamic corporate investment, financing, and risk management for a financially constrained firm. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions. Our three main results are: 1)...

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and...