Past empirical literature provides strong evidence that competitionincreases when new firms enter a market. However, rarely have economistsbeen able to examine how competition changes with the threat of entry.This paper uses the evolution of the zip code level market structure offacilities-based...

We extend Bresnahan and Reiss's (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over time. In our framework, entrants have to incur sunk costs in order to enter a market. After becoming incumbents, they disregard these entry costs in deciding whether to continue operating or to...

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We...

Past empirical literature provides strong evidence that competition increases when new firms enter a market. However, rarely have economists been able to examine how competition changes with the threat of entry. This paper uses the evolution of the zip code level market structure of...

This paper examines how manager and firm characteristics relate to entrydecisions in US local telephone markets. To do so, it develops astructural econometric model that allows managers to be heterogeneous intheir ability to correctly conjecture competitor behavior. The modeladapts Camerer, Ho,...

We examine the impact of state child care regulations on the supply and quality of care in child care markets. We exploit panel data on both individual establishments and local markets to control for state, time, and, where possible, establishment-specific fixed effects to mitigate the potential...

We examine US local telephone markets shortly after the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The data suggest that more experienced, better-educated managers tend to enter markets with fewer competitors. This motivates a structural econometric model based on behavioral game theory that allows...