We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate...

It is well known that many social decision procedures are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the decision procedures considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper we investigate the problem of constructing a social welfare function that is...

In the literature on social choice and fuzzy preferences, a central question is how to represent the transitivity of a fuzzy binary relation. Arguably the most general way of doing this is to assume a form of transitivity called max-star transitivity. The star operator in this formulation is...

In the literature on judgment aggregation, an important open question is how to measure the distance between any two judgment sets. This is relevant for issues of social choice: if two individuals hold different beliefs then we might want to find a compromise that lies somewhere between them. We...

Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements of X as belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements of X should be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We...

This note presents a simple proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem using Saari's [3, 4] "geometry of voting".