The recent process of political and economic transformation in eastern European countries has not only contributed to the decentralisation of political structure but also significantly enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities in these countries. In this context many similar types of public...

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in...

Standard models of fiscal federalism suggest many benefits of decentralization in developing economies, and there has been a recent push toward decentralization around the world. However, developing countries presently still have less decentralization, particularly on the revenue side, than both...

Most countries exhibit large and persistent geographical differences in wages, income and unemployment rates. A growing class of "place based" policies attempt to address these differences through public investments and subsidies that target disadvantaged neighborhoods, cities or regions. Place...

This paper aims at giving a theoretical background to the, some- times observed, puzzling inverse correlation between the degree of de- centralization and economic growth. We provide evidence that there is some interaction between decentralization and corruption in ex- plaining growth. Within an...

The subject of this paper is to study, thanks to a tax competition model (with tax rates fixation and response of the capital) the ability of local governments to be engaged in tax cooperation when they differ significatively in size. We?ll study cooperative and non ? cooperative choices of...

This paper studies the provision of public inputs in a federal system with unit taxation on labor. We use a model with vertical tax and expenditure externalities to analyze the e¢ ciency of equilibria under di¤erent settings, particularly Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. Our results discuss...

Presents a complete and detailed constitutional framework applying the rational self-interest model and market mechanisms to intra and inter- governmental behaviour and collective decisions. In particular, the paper presents an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of...

This paper aims at giving a theoretical background to the, some- times observed, puzzling inverse correlation between the degree of de- centralization and economic growth. We provide evidence that there is some interaction between decentralization and corruption in ex- plaining growth. Within an...

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit gamestructure s among multipleprivateage nts, multiplelocal governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal...