We study fair and efficient tax-benefit schemes based on income and non-income factors under partial control. Partial control means that each factor is a specific mixture of unobserved ability (randomly drawn by nature) and effort (chosen by individuals who differ in tastes). Factors differ in...

We argue that normative indices of multidimensional inequality do not only measure a distribution’s extent of inequity (i.e., the gaps between the better-off and the worse-off), but also its extent of inefficiency (i.e., the non-realized mutually beneficial exchanges of goods). We provide a...

<link rid="b12">Fleurbaey <i>et al.</i> (2003)</link> develop a bounded dominance test to make robust welfare comparisons, which is intermediate between <link rid="b10">Ebert's (1999)</link> cardinal dominance criterion-generalized Lorenz dominance applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by an equivalence scale-and <link rid="b2">Bourguignon's (1989)</link>...

Different social planners may have different opinions on the well-being of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translation- or ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there...