Showing 1 - 10 of 73
We examine the choice of efficient decision rules in a budget-balanced organization. The organization awards a scarce ``project'' to the organization member who values it most, and redistributes some surplus from the project among all remaining members. An auction-based allocation rule tends to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125470
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005088150
In modern U.S. agriculture, a tenant typically contracts with more than one landlord, although most of the past literature has focused exclusively on bilateral contracts with a single tenant and a single landlord. We argue that, in the presence of contractual externalities under which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005060310
Relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities, while explicit versions of these schemes are rarely used in markets for fresh fruits and vegetables and specialty grains. We show how contracts for these latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005154661
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005154917
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135482
We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and consumer surplus, but may reduce expected intermediary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005493625
This paper examines the motivations underlying the government's choice of particular policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture. The analysis suggests that policies involving overproduction by relatively high-cost producers might arise from the perceived connection between the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005501193
We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement in contracts for fresh fruits and vegetables results in a moral-hazard problem, and that the final price of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, growers are not shielded from all price risk. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503205
An agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry is estimated in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005559769