The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation....

We propose that fully informed rivals' ability to bargain on the terms of an alternative status quo can lead to the failure of asymmetric deterrence. The model we develop to support this claim allows repeated rounds of bargaining, crisis, and war until one of the rivals agrees to the other...

This study argues for a behavioral interpretation of rational choice in a changing environment that potentially restores the equilibria of discounted repeated games as useful descriptors of long-term bilateral relations between nation-states. The analysis reveals that all subgame perfect...

The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma is a reasonable model for nuclear crises (usually represented by “Chickenâ€), and for the arms race. This article addresses the existence of credible deterrence strategies that promote cooperation as a dynamically stable steady state. Decisions made...

This paper tests the hypothesis that meat and poultry wholesalers choose their inventory levels together with wholesale price so as to maximize profit made over the sales time of their stock. The behavioral assumption predicts that markup over average cost will match the inverse of the price...