The ability of firms to effectively use mechanisms that support them in profiting from technological innovation is key to outperforming competitors. Yet, such mechanisms have, for the most part, been studied in isolation, without accounting for interactions between them. We address this gap by...

This paper presents a model of patent licensing in a standard setting context when patented technologies are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions. The model allows us to assess a policy proposal put forth in the literature: that an incremental value pricing rule should define Fair, Reasonable,...

A few recent contributions have claimed that in high-tech industries—where innovation is often cumulative and products include many components which are protected by patents in the hands of many different patent holders—the cost of obtaining all necessary licenses is too high. Some have even...

We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the...

This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic...

The paper offers a new theoretical framework to examine the role of intermediaries between creators and users of new inventions. We find that uncertainty about the profitability of investing in new inventions generates a basis for intermediation. An intermediary may provide an opportunity to...

We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

This paper studies and compares licensing regimes of a cost reducing innovation in a two dimensional square city where consumers are located in the interior of the square city and pay a quadratic transport cost when moving to one of the competing firms. The difference between results in this...

This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city à la Salop. One of the firms holds a patent allowing to reduce the marginal production cost and decides to license its innovation under a fixed fee or a royalty regimes or not to license. The...

Intellectual Property Intensity (IPI) measures the weight of IP in the firm's total market value. IPI has a positive (convex) functional relationship with Price to Book (P/B) ratio, and thus may provide additional economic insight to the empirical value-growth effect. Growth firms have higher...