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Overcoming moral hazard with social networks in the workplace: An experimental approach
Dhillon, Amrita; Peeters, Ronald; Yuksel, Ayse Muge - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014
more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate moral hazard and directed altruism as the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938749
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Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers
Glazer, Amihai; Kondo, Hiroki - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2012
An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may induce that person to exert little effort to increase his income. Such behavior generates a Good Samaritan Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959976
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Contracting with altruistic agents under moral hazard
AUBERT, Cecile - Econometric Society - 2004
family) modifies incentive costs. We derive sufficient conditions for the principal to benefit from altruism. They bear on … how altruism affects the agent's marginal rate of substitution between monetary transfers and effort. We characterize the … contracts allowing to screen agents with different degrees of altruism for additive separable utilities. When two agents who are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342252
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Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision
Brunner, Markus; Sandner, Kai - In: International Journal of Game Theory 41 (2012) 3, pp. 565-602
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010557739
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Overcoming Moral Hazard with Social Networks in the Worksplace: An Experimental Approach
Dhillon, Amrita; Peeters, Ronald; Muge Yukse, Ayse - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2014
the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757449
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Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism
Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2007
mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961534
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Trust As a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency
Chami, Ralph; Fullenkamp, Connel - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2002
Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826212
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Altruism and Climate
Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2006
analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) "coerced altruism," that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets … ,and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027884
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Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
Aubert, Cécile - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006
Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795028