</titre> Since the 1970?s, Algeria?s dependency on hydrocarbons has dramatically increased. In the last decade, this sector has represented more than 40% of GDP. The country suffers from Dutch disease symptoms such as deindustrialization and increases in prices of non tradable goods and services, and...

In a model a la Baron and Myerson (1982), we revisit the question of regulating a firm under asymmetric information concerning the production cost when the principal has access to a costly monitoring procedure. Our analysis gives quite different results from the existing literature. We show that...

Cet article s'attache a determiner la politique optimale de lutte contre les ententes en prix lorsque les autorites concurrentielles observent imparfaitement le cout des firmes.

In this paper, I completely characterize the optimal policy against price-fixings when the agency in charge of competition policy lacks information about the production cost of an industry. I consider two types of punishment. The first one consists in imposing a fine proportional to the total...

Competition agencies have the power to close an antitrust case in return for the commitment to end the alleged infringement. We examine how such a procedure affects deterrence and consumer welfare. We first show that it lowers the deterrent effect of competition policy. However, under asymmetric...

Le processus d'accession de l'Algérie à l'OMC, qui a débuté en 1987 dans le cadre du GATT, est de loin le plus long parmi les négociations en cours. Malgré ce délai, un certain nombre de problèmes importants doivent encore être réglés pour aboutir à un accord. Le passage du GATT à...

This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In atwo-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show thatdownstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitablethan upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the...

We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspectorthe mission of gathering the su¢cient information to condemn a cartel. The authorityhas two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of thecollected …ne or providing him with...