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We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113383
game of strictly conflicting interest.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554366
We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580974
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stagegame actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stagegame actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804918
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804920
Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804921
Bayes Nash equilibria, as agents become patient.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011080461
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263579
We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815632
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010083661