This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government’s choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local...

Integrating evolutionary game theory with modern political economics, this article develops a Lotka--Volterra evolutionary model to explain China's incremental institutional reform. In this model, growth-oriented central leaders are intelligent designers of institutional changes; provincial and...

This paper explores the extent to which human capital improves the economic policy competence of US presidents. Several recent studies have used international data to test similar hypotheses. However, international studies suffer from a variety of comparability issues, not all of which can be...

An autocratic ruler seeking a successor who will recognize and maintain his legacy faces a dilemma. The designated successor may become too successful politically and threaten the autocrat's rule, or if not successful in achieving recognition, the designated successor may fail to remain in...

A behavioral political economy framework is built on the basis of prospect theory to explain the induced and imposed institutional changes during China's market reform, giving special attention to the integrated effects of economic and political institutions. According to prospect theory, how...

Frequent adjustments of environmental regulations usually cause business and investment risks, resulting in significant challenges for policy effectiveness. This paper examines how regulatory uncertainty affects decision making through an empirical study of the ‘Pay for Permit’ policy in the...