We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish...

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information affect their payoffs and their incentives to exert effort. For the class of contests where players' state dependent cost of effort is multiplicative, we show...

The inefficiency of competitive markets for lemons raises fundamental questions about market performance and the role of policy intervention. We study the performance of dynamic markets, and show that when the time horizon is finite decentralized markets perform better and high quality is more...

Contrary to a recent literature that questions whether price caps are effective, and even sensitive, under demand uncertainty, we show that in the absence of quantity precommitment the effects of a price cap are the same whether the demand is uncertain or deterministic. Next we study the...

Under standard assumptions about players'cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in...

A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when admissible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility...

We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents’ information fields. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the economy is "irreducible", then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium...