be visited by a consumer is equal acrossfirms not yet visited. However, in the short-run after a merger, because insiders …This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiatedproducts and … consumers search for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetricequilibrium, the probability that a firm is the next one to …

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated …

, after a merger, because insiders raise their prices more than the outsiders, consumers start searching for good deals at the …We study the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers … search sequentially for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium, consumers visit firmsrandomly. However …

See also the article <I>Search Costs, Demand-side Economies, and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition … consumers follow whenvisiting firms is equal across non-visited firms. However, after a merger,insiders raise their prices more …</I> in the 'Rand Journal of Economics'(2013). Volume 44, issue 3, pages 391-424.<P> This paper studies the incentives to …

merger, insiders raise their prices more than the outsiders, so consumers search for good deals first at the non … customers, so mergers become unprofitable for sufficiently large search costs. This new merger paradox is more likely the higher …This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and …

offered than in an equilibrium without PMGs. We also consider the incentives of firms to choose PMGs and show that an …

accounting for the possible execution of PMGs, rms prots are larger under PMGs than without. We also consider the incentives of …