In jüngerer Zeit werden im Rahmen der Investitionsbudgetierung zunehmend die Bedeutung wahrheitsinduzierender Budgetierungsverfahren wie des Groves-Mechanismus zur Überwindung von Anreizproblemen diskutiert. Charakteristisch für den Groves-Mechanismus ist, dass man bei der Performancemessung...

We model career concerns in a regime where a linear incentive contract includes a mix of a publicly observed performance measure and a second, correlated, private measure that is not observed by the labor market. Under this quot;mixquot; regime, we find that agent effort and total agency payoff...

We examine the use of earnings, forward-looking performance measures, and stock prices in managerial compensation. When the firm's owner and its manager have identical time preferences, the stock price is not useful for motivating the manager, as it is a noisy aggregation of a forward-looking...

This note contains complete proofs to the four theorems in Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) quot;Information technology, organizational design, and transfer pricing.quot; In a setting where a production department can only coarsely communicate private information to a marketing department, Theorem 1...