Governments use environmental policies, such as an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to firms, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand and the cost of abatement. Our results suggest that not only the...

In this paper we incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy as an alternative policy scheme. In particular, we develop an international oligopoly model, where governments issue non-cooperatively a number of permits and then allow their trading by their polluting...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting frms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their .rm, however,...

We construct a model of strategic environmental policy with flexible regulation in an international duopoly context. Firms can affect future environmental regulation through a prior investment in abatement. We demonstrate that the strategic use of environmental policy leads to lower welfare and...

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (J Int Econ 75:229–244, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2008</CitationRef>) show that the mode of competition determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the firms are located in different countries. In this paper, we...</citationref>

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show...

We study (energy) markets with dirty incumbents and costly entry by clean producers. For intermediate entry costs, the market outcome exhibits inefficient production and inefficient entry. A policy mix of three popular regulatory instruments—taxation on polluters, feed-in tariffs for clean...

We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete à la Cournot in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary...