We describe a two-sector, general-equilibrium model of productive sorting under output risk and incomplete information. Risk-neutral (entrepreneurial) individuals can either produce alone, or - acting as employers/insurers - team up with risk-averse (non-entrepreneurial) individuals. Although...

We report results from two different settings of a 3-player ultimatum game. Under the monocratic rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the democratic rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then extracted. A majority vote is required to...

Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks. The higher this level of illiquidity insurance the lower the investments in long run assets, and the higher the risk of a bank run generated by a real negative shock. If individuals are sufficiently risk...

We consider an endogenous growth model in which appropriate organization fosters innovation, but because of contractibility problems, this benefit cannot be internalized. The organizational design element we focus on is the division of labor, which as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by...

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democ- racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so- cial surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable...

Conventional wisdom depicts corruption as a tax on incumbent firms. This paper challenges this view in two ways. First, by arguing that corruption matters not so much because of the value of the bribe ("tax"), but because of another less studied feature of corruption, namely bribe...

Conventional wisdom depicts corruption as a tax on incumbent firms. This paper challenges this view in two ways. First, by arguing that corruption matters not so much because of the value of the bribe ("tax"), but because of another less studied feature of corruption, namely bribe...

We analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex-ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus, and ex-ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding. We show that in an oligarchy, the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus, whereas a democracy...