We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of...

We study a cardinal model of voting with three alternatives where voters’ von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are private information. We consider voting protocols given by two-parameter scoring rules, as introduced by Myerson (2002). For these voting rules, we show that all symmetric Bayes Nash...

We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine the specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of...

We study dispute resolution in the compromise model of Börgers and Postl (2009), which provides an alternative framework for analyzing the real-world procedure of tri-offer arbitration studied in Ashenfelter et al. (1992). Two parties involved in a dispute have to choose between their...

Two agents must select one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings are commonly known and diametrically opposed. Efficiency requires choosing the alternative the agents rank second whenever the weighted sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities is higher than under either agent's...

We study dominant strategy implementation in the compromise setting of Borgers and Postl (2006), in which two agents have to choose one of three mutually exclusive alternatives. The agents' ordinal rankings of these three alternatives are commonly known among them, and they are diametrically...

We study the question whether procurement procedures that simultaneously determine specification and price of a good can result in an inefficient specification choice. Two suppliers can produce a good in either of two specifications, and both are equally good for the buyer. Costs are...

This note studies an allocation problem that generalizes the compromise setup of Borgers and Postl (2006) to a setting with more than two agents, and generalizes their impossibility result.