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Oliver Williamson argues that a principal will only trust an agent when there are safeguards to ensure the agent has an incentive for trustworthiness (Williamson, O. E. [1993]. Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. <italic>The Journal of Law and Economics, 36</italic>, 453-486). However, such...
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We hypothesize that an increase in the economic pressures a farmer feels could result in that farmer being more tolerant of unethical conduct than farmers not experiencing economic pressures. To test this hypothesis, we use data from a survey of 3,000 Missouri farmers with farm sales in excess...
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We analyze the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in cattle auctions, using the problem of revaccinations as the point of departure. We present a simple model to show that if buyers do not know and cannot verify whether sellers have vaccinated their animals, then they...
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