This paper develops an infinite-horizon, political agency model with a continuum of political districts, in which incumbent politicians can improve their re-election probability by attracting swing voters in key states through strategic trade protection. A unique equilibrium is shown to exist...

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their reelection...

This paper is motivated by the observation that intermediaries play an important role in international trade. The matching role of intermediaries is examined in a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry, where intermediaries develop contacts. Intermediation expands the set...

One of the main causes behind the trade collapse of 2008-09 was a significant fall in the demand for durable goods. This paper develops a small country, overlapping generations model of international trade in which goods durability gives rise to a more than proportional fall in trade volumes, as...

One of the main causes behind the trade collapse of 2008–09 was a significant fall in the demand for durable goods. This paper develops a small country, overlapping generations model of international trade in which goods durability gives rise to a more than proportional fall in trade volumes,...

This paper develops a two-country, vertically differentiated duopoly model so as to analyse incentives for the formulation of national minimum quality standards in an open economy setting. Markets are segmented and national firms compete in both markets forming an international duopoly. Firms...

This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous network building and matching by information intermediaries. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade...

Unilateral minimum quality standards are endogenously determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative standard-setting game between the governments of two countries. Cross-country externalities from the implementation of minimum quality standards are shown to give rise to a Prisoners' Dilemma...

A two-sided, pair-wise matching model is developed to analyse the strategic interaction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The model suggests that network competition between information...

This paper analyses the determinants of outward processing (OP) trade; specifically, imports of intermediates subsequent to processing abroad. A model where firms choose between OP and importing intermediates directly from a third country (generic offshoring, GO) predicts higher tariffs, lower...