We analyze how the merger of regions affects capital tax competition in a two-tier territorial organization where both regions and cities share the same mobile tax base. We identify three effects generated by the merger of regions that impact, either directly or indirectly, both regional and...

This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three effects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the...

Dans cet article, nous dérivons de façon endogène le phénomène de contrainte budgétaire molle dans le cadre d’une fédération lorsque les décisions budgétaires sont prises au niveau décentralisé. Dans ce modèle, la mollesse de la contrainte budgétaire régionale découle de...

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of inter-municipal cooperation on local taxation. Municipalities that join/create an inter-municipal jurisdiction choose between three tax regimes, which may induce both horizontal and vertical tax externalities. Using the differences in...