We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy of the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that it is significantly associated with...

We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy for the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that shorter CEO horizon is associated...

We investigate whether diversity in points of view within corporate boards, as captured by the diversity in political ideology of board members, can affect a firm's performance. We employ personal political contributions' data to measure political ideology distance among groups of inside,...

Before the IPO bubble burst, the first day return for IPOs backed by top VC firms was double that of non-top VC IPOs. Top VC IPOs were also twice as likely to receive all-star analyst coverage and suffered twice as large negative returns upon lockup expiration. We argue that this was not a...

We aggregate different dimensions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities following the stakeholder framework proposed in Clarkson (Acad Manag Rev 20(1), 92–117, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">1995</CitationRef>) and present consistent evidence that CSR strengths targeting different stakeholders have their unique impact on...</citationref>

In this paper we examine the relation between equity mispricing and arbitrage risk, and find that stocks with high arbitrage risk have higher estimated mispricing than stocks with low arbitrage risk. These results are not limited to high book-to-market or small capitalization stocks, and they...

We investigate the link between agency costs and equity mispricing. We find that mispricing is positively related with agency costs caused by divergent objectives between agents and owners in the presence of information asymmetry where managers discriminately have better/more information than...