Despite the trend in investigating combinations of MC practices that form packages or systems, there is ambiguity about what is meant by a “control package” or “control system”. In this paper, we address questions related to MC as a package and as a system, both from a conceptual and...

In this paper, we address the question whether performance measures that are specified in annual bonus contracts represent overall performance dimensions used by boards of directors in making governance decisions. Recent studies claim that managerial incentives are predominantly provided by...

This paper empirically tests the principal-agent model prediction that the use of performance measures for incentive purposes is affected by the agent's risk aversion. We identify proxies for managerial risk aversion that can be measured using publicly available executive compensation data and...

A current issue of potential concern in theory-based management accounting research is the extent to which endogeneity limits the validity of empirical testing of models. This paper aims to stimulate debate as to the meaning of endogeneity as it applies to (management) accounting research. The...

In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the...

This study investigates the effects of attraction, retention, and incentive objectives on business unit pay strategy. Economic and psychological theories argue that differences in compensation objectives should lead to variations in organizations' pay strategies, including decisions regarding...