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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Quantitative Implications for Unemployment Insurance
Fuller, David L. - Department of Economics, Concordia University - 2010
I construct a dynamic contracting model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard that captures the transition from unemployment to non-participation observed in the data, which the standard moral hazard model fails to capture. My model generates both qualitative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533896
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A Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance
Hassler, John; Mora, José Vicente Rodríguez - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003
Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals sometimes can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity arises only for some individuals and the identity of those is unobservable. Unemployment insurance should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547525
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Unemployment Insurance Design: Inducing Moving and Retraining
Hassler, John; Mora, Rodríguez; Vicente, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504238
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels
Pollak, Andreas - EconWPA - 2004
I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk averse agents. Agents, who are characterised by different productivities or skills, are employed by firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408328
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Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761875
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762054
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Ein funktionstüchtiges System privater Arbeitslosenversicherung
Glismann, Hans H.; Schrader, Klaus - Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) - 2001
Es wird untersucht, wie ein System privater Versicherungen gegen das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit beschaffen sein sollte … Verminderung von Arbeitslosigkeit gibt. Für die Arbeitnehmer wird ein Modell zur Bestimmung des individuellen Risikos und der … darauf basierenden individuellen Prämien bei alternativen Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung entworfen. Für die Seite …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755190
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2004
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345268
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Hiring And Firing Costs, Adverse Selection And The Persistence Of Unemployment
Kugler, Adriana D.; Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model, firms use discretion in terms of whom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124276
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance contracts when agents can exert search effort but have private information about their search technology. We derive a recursive solution of our adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions under which the UI agency should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051452