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Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We … test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010625733
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271
help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I … after both implemented and randomly overridden voting. I find that informal sanctions strengthen the effect of formal ones …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107459
This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group’s success. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817248
This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817442
This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111607
using laboratory experiments. A purely rational choice perspective of a simple voting environment implies that information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259528
This paper addresses the interaction of voter information and seniority on electoral accountability. We test whether information leads voters to be less tolerant of moral hazard in a legislative system favoring seniority. A simple game theoretic model is used to predict outcomes in a pork-barrel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295260
This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors seniority. Voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295264