This paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities while investors are coordinating on a speculative attack. The authorities want to achieve specific targets for output and inflation but also to avoid a regime change (i.e. sovereign default). They use the traditional...

Market participants' risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition in°uence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important e®ects on the sustainability of currency pegs. We analyze such e®ects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action...

We augment a standard global coordination game along the lines of Morris and Shin (1998) by an asset market where prices are determined in a noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium. We study the implications of information aggregation through prices for equilibrium selection arguments in global...

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the irreversibility of early actions plays an important role in the...

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the (ir)reversibility of early actions plays an important role in the...

This paper presents a model of information and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard. This...