The price of a general insurance policy for each insurer in a competitive non-cooperative market is determined by finding the Nash equilibrium of an N-player differential game. In this game, a demand law describes the relationship between policy sales and premium, and each insurer aims to...

This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers. The strategic interaction is modelled as managers' having relative performance concerns in their objectives, either due to money flows or behavioral considerations. We provide tractable...

This paper treats the risk-averse optimal portfolio problem with consumption in continuous time with a stochastic-volatility, jump-diffusion (SVJD) model of the underlying risky asset and the volatility. The new developments are the use of the SVJD model with double-uniform jump-amplitude...

This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers. The strategic interaction is modelled as managers' having relative performance concerns in their objectives, either due to money flows or behavioral considerations. We provide tractable...

We present a continuous-time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The...

In spite of the importance of optimal contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection, current literature offers no optimal solutions to contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. The agent's risk aversion, however, appears to be critical...

An applied compact introductory survey of Markov stochastic processes and control in continuous time is presented. The presentation is in tutorial stages, beginning with deterministic dynamical systems for contrast and continuing on to perturbing the deterministic model with diffusions using...

This paper investigates strategic investment policies in a duopolistic continuous-time real options game. Our contribution is twofold, economic and methodological. The former is the recognition that, under fixed costs of investment and time-to-build, a firm's exercise of its capital-replacement...

An optimum of a Markov decision process (MDP) is said to be myopic if it can be specified by solving a series of static problems. We identify new classes of MDPs with myopic optima and sequential games with myopic equilibrium points. In one of the classes the single-period reward is homogeneous...