Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,550
Cover Image
Workers' Participation in Wage Setting and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
Franke, Jörg; Mertins, Vanessa; Gurtoviy, Ruslan - Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in … - 2014
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The … is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a … decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775967
Cover Image
Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Ruchala, Gabriele K. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233887
Cover Image
Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first step we elicit subjects’ productivity levels. Subjects then face the choice between a fixed or a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703774
Cover Image
Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566800
Cover Image
Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study
Agranov, Marina; Tergiman, Chloe - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 238-247
When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random component), contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although the theoretical advantage of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666056
Cover Image
Helping in Teams
Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011105057
Cover Image
How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that - within a reasonable framework - productive and destructive activities are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762439
Cover Image
When Pay Increases are Not Enough: The Economic Value of Wage Delegation in the Field
Mertins, Vanessa; Jeworrek, Sabrina - Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in … - 2014
By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775968
Cover Image
Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 41-60
Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage–effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage–effort relationship. We compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049828
Cover Image
Social Comparison and Peer effects with Heterogeneous Ability
BONEIN, Aurélie - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM) - 2014
observed. The knowledge of a coworker’s effort increases the level of reciprocity exhibited by observed workers (peer effects … on reciprocity. Regardless of their ability, workers exert levels of effort that are positively related to those of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934679