Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about…what...

We experimentally explore how common knowledge provided by accounting systems affects investors' decision and shapes the formation of security prices over time. We design alternative accounting structures and run experiments in artificial security markets framed by these structures. In sessions...

For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which we formalize within an epistemic model. We present an...

In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability is assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility...

A stationary object is hidden in location i, i=1,2,...,K, with probability p <Subscript> i </Subscript>. There are M sensors available and each location can be searched by at most one sensor at each instant of time. Each search of a location takes one unit of time and is conducted independently of previous searches,...</subscript>

We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in subsequent ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and then charge exogenous participation fees according to the auction price sequences observed in...

Based on forward induction, existing experimental studies have shown that an outside option, when offered to one of the two players who later participate in a battle-of-the-sexes game, facilitates coordination. However, the particular outside-option payoffs that these studies used may have led...

We first consider money-burning games studied by Ben-Porath and Dekel [6]. We show that iterative weak dominance and extensive form rationalizability yield the same unique outcome in this class of games. This result suggests that weak dominance captures the forward induction logic implied by...