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Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886157
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - CESifo - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889984
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation
Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265296
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - CESifo - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257671
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms – which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891173
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Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut - Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance … - 2009
. We show that concerns for social welfare and inequality aversion call for opposite investment choices. In the experiment … under which players give an advantageous sharing rule. Power-sharing can be successful in the experiment, even when it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064619
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Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
on average players’ investments are larger than equilibrium investments. In contrast to social dilemma experiments, in … our experiment preferences for social welfare and those for equality call for different actions. Surprisingly, even … experiment, even when it is not in a selfish world. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032030
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The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments
Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut - In: European Economic Review 61 (2013) C, pp. 169-185
We use an experiment to study the effect of ex-post sharing rules on relationship-specific investments in an incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665913
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Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem
Erlei, Mathias; Roß, Wiebke - Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Technische … - 2013
We provide experimental evidence for the hypothesis that bounded rationality is an important element of the theory of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010940492