This paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference-dependent choice behavior. Instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem, we suitably relax the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to obtain, endogenously, the...

This paper axiomatizes models of second-order ambiguous beliefs in the original domain of preferences of Anscombe and Aumann (Ann Math Stat 34:199–205, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1963</CitationRef>) by weakening the first-stage independence postulate. The models we propose include the second-order subjective expected utility (SOSEU)...</citationref>

Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) show that preferences over menus of lotteries can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We provide foundations for Bayesian updating in such a setup. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Bayesian updating...

This paper suggests an alternative axiomatization of two canonical models of ambiguity aversion. Instead of relaxing the independence axiom to accommodate uncertainty aversion, we impose independence on constant acts only. Maxmin and variational preferences are characterized by different...

This paper characterizes ambiguity averse preferences in the absence of the completeness axiom. We axiomatize multiple selves versions of some of the most important examples of complete and ambiguity averse preferences, and characterize when those incomplete preferences are ambiguity averse.

Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [3] characterize preferences over menus of lotteries that can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We investigate what would be the appropriate version of Dynamic Consistency in such a setup. The condition we find, which we call...