. Contrary to CS, in this model, the informativeness of communication is not always decreasing in the level of conflict of … interest. Relatedly, communication can be more informative than in CS. …

communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary …-maker to obtain more information. However, this information can never be perfect, and sophisticated communication games, for …

inability to commit to truthtelling destroys all meaningful communication in equilibrium unless there is a cost of lying. In the … experiment, receivers are overly trusting and experts learn to take advantage of this. As experts gain experience they tell … neither harmful nor universal lie aversion is a factor when communication is noisy, provided individuals have time to discover …

we increase the precision the experts' signals. Second, the inefficiency in communication also converges to zero as the …We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade …-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can …

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the … market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status … if reports are not public. Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are …

toward some favoured decision but cares also about its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the … on experts biased against the status quo. We also show that it is optimal to publically disclose the expert report …

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …