primitives such as sanction intensity, disutility of silence and size of the minority group. A dynamic extension sheds light on …

hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose … economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly … punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the …

hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose … economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly … for them. Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punish the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment …

Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions …-costly. Problems in creating and enforcing norms are related to which sanctions are employed. We use our analysis of enforcement and … creation of norms to analyze the scope of feasible government action either to promote desirable norms or to repress …

We report data from public goods games showing that privately-implemented punishment reduces cooperation in relation to … a baseline treatment without punishment. When that same incentive is implemented publicly, however, cooperation is … sustained at significantly higher rates than in either the baseline or private punishment treatments. Our design ensures that …