Asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection and market failure. In a dynamic setting, asymmetric information also limits reclassification risk. This certainty offsets the costs of adverse selection. Using a dynamic model of endogenous insurance choice and price calibrated to the U.S....

Adverse selection death spirals in health insurance are dramatic, and so far, exotic economic events. The possibility of death spirals has garnered recent policy and popular attention because the pricing regulations in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 make health plans more vulnerable to them...

Risk adjustment is used in settings with uncertainty to make payments or allow comparisons of outcomes while controlling for exogenous risk factors that explain variations in the outcome of interest, such as spending, utilisation, quality or death. This article focuses on the conceptual and...

The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important policy implications.  For example, if adverse selection effects are small while moral hazard effects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory...

Background &Objectives: Financial burden on households due to healthcare is high in India but only small segments of the population are covered with health insurance. This study has two objectives: 1. to investigate the factors affecting enrolment in voluntary health insurance, and 2. to examine...

Against the background of Mexico's persistently high degree of inequality, this paper analyzes the country's experience with pro-poor policies over the last decade. A number of important government initiatives, implemented since the mid-1990s, have aimed at improving distributional equity...

In our theoretical model some firms do not offer health insurance to their employees because of large between-firm heterogeneity in expected employee health care costs. Because job turnover rates for healthier employees reduce by less than those for sicker employees when firms offer health...

We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently...