This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly, and compares them under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. Under any policy regime, whether...

We develop a Hotelling model of horizontally and vertically differentiated brands with misleading advertising competition. We investigate the question of who benefits or loses from the misinformation created by advertising competition and related regulatory policies. We show that the quality...

In this paper, we characterize optimal environmental policy in a case where innovation in clean production technologies is developed and provided by a monopoly. Two policy instruments are considered: an emission tax on downstream polluting firms and an R& D subsidy for an upstream innovator in...

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the...

This paper builds a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with horizontal product differentiation and advertising externality between firms. We investigate the effects of regulating misinformation on market competition, behaviour of firms, and social welfare. We show...

This paper investigates the welfare effects of unilateral or multilateral technological progress in a world with global public goods. We focus on the consumption relation between the private and the public good, and then show that technological progress may be“self-centered” (benefit oneself...

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the...

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to...

This paper investigates the welfare effects of international transfers of environmental technologies in open economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution, and shows that policy differentiation between the donor and recipient countries and/or product differentiation between...