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Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 490-509

of two conditions, monotonicity and reshuffling invariance, that are always necessary, but not always sufficient for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049708

Saari, Donald G. - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 3, pp. 529-555

Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know that these problems can occur, the next...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370860

The impossibility of social evaluations of infinite streams with strict inequality aversion

Alcantud, José Carlos R. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We are concerned with the problem of aggregating infinite utility streams and the possible adoption of consequentialist equity principles when using numerical evaluations of the streams. We find a virtually universal incompatibility between the Basu-Mitra approach (that advocates for social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323234

A Behavioral Arrow Theorem

Miller, Alan D.; Rachmilevitch, Shiran - Department of Economics, University of Haifa - 2012

monotonicity axiom which requires that the collective preference become more rational when the individual preferences become more … monotonicity axiom and the other standard assumptions introduced by Arrow (1963): unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672255

Monotonicity of Power Indices

Turnovec, Frantisek - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1997

and global monotonicity of power indices are introduced. Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Coleman, and Holler-Packel indices are … analyzed and it is proved that while Shapley-Shubik index satisfies both local and global monotonicity property, Banzhaf …-Coleman satisfies only local monotonicity without being globally monotonic and Holler-Packel index satisfies neither local nor global …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704167

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

Maniquet, François - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 1, pp. 1-15

Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753065

Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 3, pp. 447-460

Consider a problem of sharing a fixed amount of input (for example, pollution permits) among a group of agents who own technologies which transform an input good into an output good and who are interested in their shares of output only. A solution assigns each profile of technologies a pair of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753071

A robust theory of resource allocation

Chichilnisky, Graciela - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1994

becasue the essence of the social choice problem, such as Condorcet triples, rules out monotonicity. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619515

Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 10-12

neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603133

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415

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