fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I defi…ne a new … Zeckhauser's (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustifi…ed lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents …

action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms …