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Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power
Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael J. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008
We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004172
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To each according to her luck and power: Optimal corporate governance and compensation policy in a dynamic world
Noe, Thomas H. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007
We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world ….  We show that managerial compensation and governance policies, which, in a single-period context, can best be rationalized … example, shareholder wealth is maximized by governance policies that tie board deference to generous compensation and link the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004279
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Sharing a Director with a Peer
Berg, Tatjana; Horsch, Philipp; Schmid, Markus - School of Finance, Universität St. Gallen - 2015
Exploiting a unique feature of the Clayton Antitrust Act, we analyze how directors holding outside directorships at peer firms affect firm value and performance of financial firms. We find that directors serving simultaneously at horizontally-related firms have a negative impact on firm value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011273999
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Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power
Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael J.; Sonti, Ramana - Finance Research Centre, Oxford University - 2008
We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212080
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Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power
Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael J.; Sonti, Ramana - Finance Research Centre, Oxford University - 2008
We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631379
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To each according to her luck and power: Optimal corporate governance and compensation policy in a dynamic world
Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael J. - Finance Research Centre, Oxford University - 2007
We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world …. We show that managerial compensation and governance policies, which, in a single-period context, can best be rationalized … example, shareholder wealth is maximized by governance policies that tie board deference to generous compensation and link the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729990
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Inside the Family Firm
Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper; Pérez-González, … - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 2005
This paper uses a unique dataset from Denmark to investigate (1) the role of family characteristics in corporate decision making, and (2) the consequences of these decisions on firm performance. We focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer (CEO). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419431
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Blockholders and Corporate Governance
Edmans, Alex - In: Annual Review of Financial Economics 6 (2014) 1, pp. 23-50
shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a … consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through an alternative mechanism known as “exit … governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094546
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Blockholders and Corporate Governance
Edmans, Alex - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a … consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through the alternative mechanism of “exit … governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084247
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Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail – Institutional Fund Twins
EVANS, Richard B.; FAHLENBRACH, Rüdiger
Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highly correlated returns. But these “twin” funds are separate portfolios for different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail and institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550272