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Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 3, pp. 1122-1149

/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies … arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for playerʼs names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we … existence and upper hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. We illustrate the idealized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043030

Large distributional games with traits

Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 502-505

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been … presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041659

Large Distributional Games with Traits

Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao - Department of Economics, Ryerson University - 2012

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been … with traits (LDGT). In addition to a generalization of work initiated and advocated by Mas-Colell (1984), we delineate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587670

On the space of players in idealized limit games

Qiao, Lei; Yu, Haomiao - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 177-190

This paper demonstrates the class of atomless spaces that accurately models the space of players in a large game which represents an idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games. Through two examples, we show that arbitrary atomless probability spaces, in particular, the Lebesgue unit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930794

Point-Rationalizability in Large Games

Yu, Haomiao - Department of Economics, Ryerson University - 2012

In this paper, I characterize point-rationalizability in large non-anonymous games with three dierent formulations of societal responses, and also propose an implicit dynamic process that is informed by Guesnerie's eductive notions. Given the introspection and 'mentalizing' that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010563953

Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games

Yu, Haomiao; Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145591

The marginal pricing rule revisited.

Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; Cornet, Bernard; Czarnecki, … - Maison des Sciences Économiques, Université Paris 1 … - 2005

The purpose of the paper is to introduce a tighter definition for the marginal pricing rule. By means of an example, we illustrate the improvements that one gets with the new definition with respect to the former one with the Clarke's normal come.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005510654

Competitive Equilbrium: Walras Meets Darwin.

Flam, S.D.; Snadvik, B. - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2000

Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to evolutionary stable prices. Focus is on local...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487287

Indeterminacy of equilibrium in stochastic OLG models

Magill, Michael; Quinzii, Martine - In: Economic Theory 21 (2003) 2, pp. 435-454

This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods, and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments and the stochastic process determining the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370690

On a covering theorem

Idzik, Adam; Ichiishi, Tatsuro - In: Economic Theory 19 (2002) 4, pp. 833-838

A simple proof of Reny and Wooders' recent strengthening of Shapley's extension of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma on a closed cover of a simplex is given. The proof uses Ky Fan's coincidence theorem.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370919