It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...

The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...

In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions onthe payoff function ƒ and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probabilitymeasures instead of the set of mixed strategies.

In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions onthe payoff function ƒ and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probabilitymeasures instead of the set of mixed strategies.

In this note we review some known minimax theorems with applications in game theory and show that these results form an equivalent chain which includes the strong separation result in finite dimensional spaces between two disjoint closed convex sets of which one is compact. By simplifying the...

In this note we review some known minimax theorems with applications in game theory and show that these results form an equivalent chain which includes the strong separation result in finite dimensional spaces between two disjoint closed convex sets of which one is compact. By simplifying the...

This paper analyzes communication from the viewpoint of the level-n theory of bounded rationality. It examines if communication can be understood by the effect it has on high-level types’ beliefs about the actions of simpleminded level-0 players. We present experimental evidence from a...

Standard game-theoretic solution concepts do not guarantee meaningful commu- nication in cheap-talk games. In this paper, we define a solution concept which guarantees communication for a large class of games by designing a behavior pro- tocol which the receiver uses to judge messages sent by...

I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003