This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined in a two dimensional characteristic space, and consumers do not know which firm sells which quality. Equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which balance consumers' relative valuation of goods'...

In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena...

We raise the problem of the minorities survival in the presence of positive network externalities. We rely on the example of thematic clubs to illustrate why and in which circumstances such survival problems might appear, first considering the case of simple network externalities and then the...

This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price...

This article analyzes price competition in a duopolistic newspaper industry, where politically differentiated newspapers compete in 2 distinct markets: circulation and advertising. Assuming that 1 of the newspapers represents the “voice of the majority,” the theory of the circulation spiral...

We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal dierentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with dierent consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the...

We explore the issue of minorities' survival in the presence of positive network externalities. We rely on a simple example of thematic clubs to illustrate why and how such survival problems might appear, first considering the case of simple-network effects (fully anonymous externalities) and...