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We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594322
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568440
so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games … undominated Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, which form a strategically stable set of equilibria, when voters are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150911
so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games … undominated Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, which form a strategically stable set of equilibria, when voters are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652415
This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the re vealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets, the exercice is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826830
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338