Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) show that spatial agglomeration appears in a standard two-stage location price model if symmetric firms collude in prices. We introduce a cost difference between two firms. We show that agglomeration never appears in a collusive equilibrium even when...

We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends...

We investigate the manner in which vertical separation affects lobbying activities as well as the access charges for essential facilities. We find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and new...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....

In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments.

The recent developments in information technology (IT) have enabled firms to employ personalized pricing. Should all firms employ personalized pricing even though the adaptation costs of such pricing strategies are not high? This paper theoretically demonstrates a situation in which all firms do...