We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect corporate risk-taking. Using hand-collected data on French publicly-listed companies over the period 2003-2007, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS, other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), are...

Consistent with a bank-centered governance system, Japanese firms exhibit an exceptionally low level of performance variability. The increased involvement of foreign investors motivated by shareholder value is thus likely to have triggered a major shift in their risk-taking behavior. My results...

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on the risk taking of Japanese firms. We show that family control and ownership concentration are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk, whereas bank control has the opposite effect. Considering the link between idiosyncratic risk and...

The difficulty to measure the long-term benefits of R&D expenditures and the distortions induced by R&D accounting suggest that R&D-intensive firms could be undervalued. Using several methods commonly applied to detect the abnormal returns associated with mispricing, we find little evidence that...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test two agency-based hypotheses regarding the effect of ownership concentration on dividend policy using a large sample of Japanese firms. Design/methodology/approach – Level regressions associating payout rates to ownership concentration are run....

This article evaluates the extent and sources of value associated with the divestitures of French firms over the period 1990 to 2010. The results show that excess returns are consistently higher when the divesting firm is highly levered. The market reaction is also stronger when the seller's...

Divestitures create shareholder value by helping firms to optimize their portfolio of assets. However, firms may forego value enhancing divestitures because of agency problems. More specifically, large controlling shareholders may prefer to retain the assets in order to extract private benefits...

Consistent with a bank-centered governance system, Japanese firms exhibit an exceptionally low level of performance variability. The increased involvement of foreign investors motivated by shareholder value is thus likely to have triggered a major shift in their risk-taking behavior. My results...

Consistent with existing evidence based on US firms, we show that good governance is associated with higher credit ratings. The most significant variables are institutional ownership and disclosure quality. This finding suggests that active monitoring (by large shareholders) and lower...

Evidence based on US firms suggests that large boards restrain risk taking. We investigate whether a similar effect exists in Japan. Our results confirm that firms with larger boards exhibit lower performance variability relative to firms with smaller boards. However, this effect is less...