We extend the basic model of trade protection with special interest groups developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) to include monopolistic competition with variable markups. We find the following results: (i) for sectors organized into lobbies the endogenous import tariff is always positive and...

This paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monopolistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of...

This paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of...

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firm profit and firm size may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively...

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively...

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively...

The present paper modifies the \Protection for Sale" model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) to account for heterogeneous firms lobbying for non-tariff barriers to trade, such as technical standards or certification requirements. They raise the fixed costs of market access for both domestic...

This paper investigates the price dispersion of U.S. imports at the good-category level across U.S. districts of entry. Although there is a large heterogeneity across goods, on average, the implied markups of a simple model explain about 31% of the price dispersion, while the implied marginal...

Price dispersion of US imports are investigated across US districts of entry. Markups explain about 31% of price dispersion, while marginal costs of production explain about 69%; effects of trade costs, for which we have actual data, are almost none.

This paper measures the pass-through of trade costs into U.S. import prices by using actual data on duties/tariffs and freight-related costs. The key innovation is to decompose the indirect effects of trade costs (on prices) into the effects on markups, quality and productivity while...