Strategic investment is studied in a model where oligopolists take decisions sequentially. First period investment determines second period wealth and output, and this is anticipated correctly by Cournot oligopolists. In our model with linear technology firms invest less as competition...

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.

We develop and experiment with new upper bounds for the constrained maximum-entropy sampling problem. Our partition bounds are based on Fischer's inequality. Further new upper bounds combine the use of Fischer's inequality with previously developed bounds.

Results for the identification of non-linear models are used to support the raditional form of he order condition by sufficient conditions. The sufficient conditions reveal a two step procedure for firstly checking generic identification and then testing identifiability. This approach canbe...